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CLASH OF STRATEGIES: PAX AMERICANA AND THE NUCLEAR AMBITIONS OF NORTH KOREA
There is a world of difference between a hated dictator and a hated dictator with nukes.
-Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski USN (Ret) America is currently in a precarious position as it grapples with developing the right strategy for resolving the current crisis with North Korea (NK). For nearly 50 years the United States (US) has negotiated with NK in an effort to maintain stability on the Korean peninsula, nudge NK into the fold of democracy, and, one day, achieve Korean unity. The net result of a half-century's worth of US appeasement reveals that NK is in better shape now than it was at the end of the Korean War. North Korea has progressed from being a regional menace to a genuine nuclear weapons power that may threaten the security of the US homeland.
Failure to "denuclearize" NK and achieve long-term stability poses real danger to the US, her interests, and the interests of her regional Asian allies. A miscalculation resulting in a nuclear detonation on the Korean peninsula or in the American homeland would have unimaginable consequences -at best, an economic and humanitarian catastrophe -at worst, a death spiral into World War III and global nuclear weapons exchange.
Herein lies the dilemma for the US-to strike at the North Koreans now, and risk war on our terms; or wait and attempt to apply increasing pressure to contain and wear them down in order to develop long term stability, and risk war, on their terms.
How is it possible for one of the world's greatest powers to be put on the "horns of a dilemma," strategically, by an economically failed rogue state?
1 What actions should the US take to protect its interests and preserve peace?
The solution is not more of the same, nor is it a new strategy based on a preemptive strike. The solution requires a strategic plan that clearly communicates US intentions and resolve to put NK on a path all parties can accept. It requires a plan based on a historical analysis of how the North Koreans have continually out maneuvered the US at the negotiating table and an understanding of their goals, strengths, and weakness. It requires a strategy of balanced coercion.
NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS AND THE AGREED FRAMEWORK
Since the 1960s, NK steadily pursued a nuclear capability, though they steadfastly denied possession of a nuclear weapons program until October 2003. 2 At various times in the last 40 years, Russia, East Germany, and China have supported NK with technical and material assistance to their nuclear program-allegedly for energy vice weaponry-but cut them off when they realized it was either no longer in their interest to support or trust the North Koreans. 3 As a response to growing international concerns the USSR successfully pressured NK into signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985. 4 After nearly four decades of numerous crises, and little diplomatic progress, the signing of the Agreed Framework in October 1994 seemed to point to a new dawn in US and North
Korean relations. 5 The intent of the Agreed Framework was to create conditions for normalized relations between the US and NK, bring about a "resumption of North-South dialogue between
Pyongyang and Seoul," and eliminate 's nuclear weapons program and its potential to export nuclear technology to third parties. 6 Despite all the fanfare generated by the Agreed Framework, it collapsed when NK pulled out on 8 May 1998.
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THE CALM BEFORE THE STORM: MORE NUCLEAR REVELATIONS
Even with the demise of hope contained within the pages of the Agreed Framework, a series of sweeping North Korean initiated positive events occurred in the summer of 2002.
These initiatives included high level diplomatic meetings both in the US and in Pyongyang;
agreements to reestablish rail and road links between the two nations; demining sections of the DMZ; sending NK athletes to the Asian Games in Pusan, South Korea, and 's stunning admission they had kidnapped Japanese nationals from Japan in the 1970s and 1980s. 8 Then, in October 2002, the US was shocked when NK announced it was in the process of building a highly enriched uranium (HEU) nuclear weapons program and intended to "restart its frozen plutonium-based nuclear program at Yongbyon"-including reprocessing spent reactor fuel rods stored at the facility. These actions would provide NK with plutonium for nuclear weapons. 9 Adding more fuel to the fire are recent intelligence reports that K has already produced enough weapons grade plutonium to make half a dozen nuclear weapons. 10 Finally, in January 2003, NK withdrew from the NPT causing significant international concern.
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Of great concern to the US and the Asian regional players, is that in two meetings of the six party talks focused on resolving the danger, there has been no substantial progress. 12 The reason for this failure seems to be NK's view that nuclear weapons are its "only valuable national asset…" and so far, they have not seen a good reason to relinquish them. 13 Although there have been offers to provide some assistance to NK, the Bush administration refuses to provide whatever it is that NK is demanding. For the US to give in would be to yield to nuclear blackmail.
14 However, the single most significant event to change the face of the strategic landscape in 
NORTH KOREAN GOALS AND INTERESTS
North Korea has several goals as depicted in Figure 2 . 24 The regime cares for the needs and survival of its people only to the degree it ensures the survival of the regime itself.
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Everything it does is about self-protection of the regime. At the close of the Korean War, North Korea was worse off than it is today. It was recognized only by its ideological sponsors, condemned by the international community for instigating a war, and devastated as a result of its own aggression. Today, North Korea has obtained political recognition, security assurances, and significant economic assistance from its former enemies. Its negotiating strategy has brought the regime back from the point of collapse time and again during the intervening years. 31 The point is that to label NK as "irrational" is to fail to recognize their success. A closer look at the North Korean negotiating strategy reveals anything but irrational behavior: unorthodox maybe-irrational, no.
NORTH KOREAN NEGOTIATING STRATEGY
The US has historically underestimated NK's mastery of high stakes negotiations to gain concessions from the US. A myth that needs to be dispelled is that North Korean negotiating strategy is a matter of culture-it is not-it is a tactic. 34 North Korean negotiating techniques include actions beyond the pale of acceptable international diplomatic behavior and utterly foreign to Western negotiators. Their rude and abrasive behavior is clearly designed to intimidate and rattle opponents. 35 Downs' excellent summary of NK's negotiation strategy follows:
North Korea initiates negotiations by appearing to be open to fundamental changes in its policies, uses its willingness to participate to demand benefits and concessions, and terminates discussions when it has gained maximum advantage. It manages negotiations so that its adversaries experience stages of optimism, disillusionment, and disappointment. Adversaries' disappointment, in turn, paves the way for creating an illusion of fresh cooperation in the initial stage of the next negotiation. Whatever talks are under way when the reader considers these words, one of these cyclic stages will apply. And whatever state applies will be replaced as the negotiating process proceeds. The cycle can be expected to continue as long as the current regime holds power.
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Just one of the many negotiating examples that bears out the above-described cycle is reflected in the crisis over NK's building of nuclear reactors in the early 1990's. In this example, NK allowed the West to get just enough information about steps it was taking to build a nuclear weapons facility, to cause alarm, all the while denying the very thing they wanted the US to conclude. The major crisis they intentionally created necessitated the West seek to negotiate to resolve the situation. 37 North Korea knew the US would defeat them if war were to ensue, but they confidently based on their brinkmanship strategy to cause the US to do almost anything to avoid war. They knew us better than we knew them. The US must recognize that its reluctance to apply its great strength in its dealing with NK only undermines its ability to achieve success. According to Chuck Downs, "the genuine alternative to war with North Korea is now, and always has been, credible deterrence. North
Korea will not consciously incite a regime-terminating war any more than it will pursue regimethreatening reforms. In every instance when Western resolve was credible, North Korea 
NORTH KOREAN CENTER OF GRAVITY AND CRITICAL VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
In the end the US will only achieve its goals in Korea when it compels NK to submit to its will. In order for the US to accomplish its goals it must determine what the North Korean Center(s) of gravity are and then determine how to defeat them without a conventional attrition fight.
One of the most effective ways to defeat a center of gravity is to determine the capabilities that "[enable] a center of gravity to function as such" and then, in turn, determine what the critical requirements are that provide the "essential conditions, resources and means for a critical capability to be fully operative." 44 Finally, those critical requirements that can be attacked are then designated critical vulnerabilities and a strategy is developed that applies the elements of national power against the critical vulnerabilities to cause the center of gravity to collapse. 45 My analysis reveals that NK has two strategic centers of gravity: the first is Kim Jung Il and the second is NK's nuclear weapons capability. An explanation of how I arrived at these two centers of gravity is provided in the endnotes. 46 The chart below reflects my assessment of The above center of gravity analysis reflects at least six critical vulnerabilities for Center of Gravity (1) and two critical vulnerabilities for Center of Gravity (2) that can be targeted by a wellorchestrated US strategy. Additional details on targeting North Korean centers of gravity are discussed later in the paper.
COURSES OF ACTION
The key to developing a workable strategy is to understand the opponent. First, the US must nail down the linkages between NK's strategic objectives, its centers of gravity, and its related critical vulnerabilities; second, the strategy must focus all the elements of national power on NK's critical vulnerabilities so that enough pressure is applied on their centers of gravity that the regime bends to the will of the US. I have determined there are three basic strategic course of action (COA) for dealing with NK: one, status quo; two, preemptive strike; and three, balanced coercion.
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COA-1: STATUS QUO
A COA available to the US is to maintain the status quo-that is, to continue to isolate and contain NK and deal with the issues as they arise. It can be argued that despite how one feels about the US's seeming inability to keep NK from achieving considerable success at gaining attention for its issues, NK continues to be a rogue state diplomatically and a failed state economically. Additionally, it has yet "to achieve its stated long-term goals-revolution in the South, reunification of the peninsula under socialism, and withdrawal of foreign forces…." 48 On the surface this seems to be a safe, conservative, and logical course of action for all the major state players involved with North Korean issues because it contains no radical departures from what "the players" expect the US to do-no surprises, if you will. The more consistent the US's actions, the less likely its intent will be misinterpreted which reduces the likelihood of triggering an unintended incident that sets off a series of unanticipated consequences that spiral down into a catastrophic event.
The problem with the status quo COA is the strategic situation has changed dramatically the capacity to produce a large number of biological weapons." 49 This combined capability truly transforms the threat in NK from one of regional security to one of US homeland security. It is not enough to think that NK is unlikely to attack the US; the fact of the matter is they will soon have the capability to pursue that option. Furthermore, their past record of selling missile technology to third parties and their recent pronouncement they might be willing to sell nuclear technology to a "third party" plays right into America's worst fear-terrorist detonation of a nuclear device in a US city. The US simply cannot afford to continue to surrender the initiative to NK, which has proven to be unpredictable, strategically adroit, and able to disprove all those who believe that, like the USSR, its collapse is inevitable. The effect on the world of a nuclear detonation in a major US city is unimaginable. To a degree, even two years after the loss of the World Trade Center Towers, and the death of nearly 3,000 people, the US remains in a state of semi-shock. If the world has not changed because of the attack, the willingness of the US to act militarily, with or without UN support, has, and in an unprecedented manner. Because of the attacks of 11 September, the US has used military force to effect regime change in not one but two countries in the Middle East and done so in less than 24 months.
We now face, in NK, a nation with a more able military than Iraq, a known nuclear based weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program, and the will to assist a third party in gaining a nuclear weapons capability. One would be hard pressed to create a better scenario to justify a preemptive attack. Given all we know about NK today, imagine the public and world outcry if the regime directed the detonation of a nuclear weapon in the US or provided assistance to a terrorist organization who detonated a nuclear weapon in the US, and we did not act preemptively.
The problem with a preemptive strike, however, is that to be effective the US would have to destroy all the nuclear weapons possessed by NK or face a retaliatory nuclear strike.
Whether or not a post-attacked NK could pull off a nuclear weapons detonation on the US homeland is impossible to determine. To be sure, the risk of a nuclear weapon being used against Seoul and/or US military forces in Korea as a response to a US attack would have to be considered as possible, if not probable. Of course, if it comes down to trading a nuclear catastrophe in Korea or in the US heartland, most Americans, if given the choice, would demand it take place in Korea. Regardless of the strategy the US develops and applies to NK, if we get it wrong and NK conducts a nuclear first strike against the US, a preemptive US strike may suddenly seem like a missed opportunity. But we are not there yet.
COA 3: BALANCED COERCION
COA 3 is based on recognition of NK's priority of regime survival, its negotiating strategy, and the changing regional security and political situation.
First, the US must not allow a third party to gain access to a WMD provided by NK. This must not be negotiable. The US is on the threshold of facing this threat.
Second, the US must recognize, based on an historical analysis, that the North Korean regime's first objective is its own survival-that means that it is not suicidal and will respond to opportunities to survive when faced with certain destruction.
Third, in order to convince the regime that they can in fact survive, the US must allow a place for them in the international community, for now. This is the one part of the strategy that the US simply must take a longer view on achieving. 51 The US's first goal must be homeland security, followed by regional security, followed by a democratic Korean peninsula. In order to make the offer of regime survival a plausible alternative, the US must be willing to allow a communist regime to survive, otherwise there is no incentive for the regime to give up its nuclear weapons capability.
Fourth, the US must recognize that the only time the North Koreans have backed down and complied with US desires is when credible military threat was applied to the regime. 52 The US must make it clear to the North Koreans they will be destroyed if they do not comply. They must also be made to believe that the US is prepared to fight in a nuclear environment to achieve that goal. If the US is not prepared to go that far, then there is no credible way to prevent the North Koreans from further developing their nuclear ICBM capability or selling nuclear technologies/weapons to a third party. In other words, if the US is not prepared to fight them on their own soil now, then it will simply have no leverage to stop North Korean development of a nuclear weapons capability, which will one day be able to strike the US homeland or be marketed to a "third party" terrorist group. The North Koreans must believe the US is a credible threat to their survival and time has run out.
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Last, the US will have to provide incentive "carrots" to NK as it works its way along the US demanded path. It may sound like appeasement, but the reality is it acknowledges the human element of "what is in it for me" that drives many of the decisions made by the human species.
This part of the strategy requires the skillful use of all the elements of national power in a manner to reward good behavior and punish bad behavior. The US must provide the right kind of incentives, at the right time, to elicit the desired action from the regime. However, at anytime the regime stumbles, the US must not delay adjusting the application of the elements of national power. The US must immediately coerce the regime back onto the agreed path and the form of coercion most likely required is the only kind they understand-military power aimed directly at the survival of the regime.
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Defeating the North Korean Centers of Gravity.
The following is my analysis of how the elements of national power can be applied against the critical vulnerabilities identified in Figures (3) and (4).
• o Finally, a regional security forum should be signed between the US, Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, and NK.
With the successful implementation of the above strategy, the North Korean goal of regime survival will have been met. All the US goals have been met with the exception of a democratic Korean peninsula. Time and the positive influence of democracy will have to work their magic to bring about NK's transition to democracy, supported by a consistent and firm US resolve to communicate its will to act militarily should NK not abide by its agreement to denuclearize. All of these actions support an eventual "soft" vice "hard" landing when the North Korean regime eventually succumbs to a peaceful transition to democracy.
A FINAL COMMENT
North Korea represents the most significant threat to US security and interests in the world today. North Korea's likely possession of nuclear weapons and its recently developed ICBM capability put the safety of the US homeland at risk. North Korea's record of selling missile technology to third parties and its recent pronouncement that it may be willing to sell nuclear technology to a third party, represents America's greatest fear. It is a threat the US must not ignore. However, neither a knee jerk reaction that relies on preemptive attack nor a continuation of US diplomatic policy, vis a vis a failed negotiating strategy, combined with a lack of understanding of human nature, is the solution either. The US must incorporate some degree of "real-politick" to offset the moral high-ground negotiations baggage that often contributes more to creating problems than solutions. Now is the time for a level of strategic vision and enlightened leadership that demonstrates the pragmatic talents required by the world's greatest power, if it is to achieve a Pax Americana and realize its central role in ensuring peace, stability, and prosperity for the world.
WORD COUNT=5940 45 Ibid., 43.
46 I worked diligently to follow Carl Von Clausewitz's dictum to trace the source of enemy strength to "the fewest possible sources, and ideally to one alone" but in the end I determine there were two strategic center's of gravity. See: Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, edited and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 619. I determined that Kim Jung Il is a strategic center of gravity because it is his skill and control that perpetuates the Korean crisis. His power, influence, and continued survival are amazing. His will, so similar to that of his father, Kim IL Sung, is the source of the regime's effective negotiating strategy. I also determined NK's possession of a nuclear weapons capability is the second strategic center of gravity. It is the nuclear weapons threat and the West's aversion to escalating a conflict into nuclear war that really gives strength to Kim Jung Il. One could argue that by definition the nuclear weapons capability is really a critical capability, vice a center of gravity, because it directly supports Kim's role as the hub of all power. But, the situation is more complex than first analysis reveals. There is no question that Kim is very dangerous due to his skillful brinkmanship strategy. Even before the US belief that NK possessed nuclear weapons it was very wary of Kim, who frequently gained the upper hand during negations. But, NK's possession of nuclear weapons means that anyone who succeeds Kim will likely have access and control of the nuclear weapons as well. 47 These courses of action are built on the assumption that NK will not be successful in fracturing the alliance between the US, South Korea, and Japan. Similarly, although the direct support of Russia and China in pursuing the chosen COA would be helpful, it is not essential. What is essential is they not oppose the adopted COA in a determined manner to undermine it. Therefore, it is also assumed, as difficult as it may be, the US will be successful in gaining the required support for the chosen COA from each of the key nations. 48 Downs, 255 . 51 The balanced coercion strategy acknowledges that there is merit to the notion that communist regimes will one-day collapse of their own accord. When NK eliminates its nuclear weapons capability it will be rewarded with diplomatic recognition and a wide variety of aid in the forms of investments and loans. North Korea's return to the international community and the continued positive influences of democracy and globalization will erode the underpinnings of communism and set the conditions for NK to achieve the "soft-landing" desired by all the participants. 52 There are numerous examples of NK's change in attitude when the US put pressure on the regime. Admiral Turner Joy relates the effect of the renewed United Nation's offensive in the summer of 1951 in driving the North Koreans back to the negotiating table with a significantly more accommodating attitude. Increased US military posture as a result of the Panmunjom axe murders resulted in significant behavioral changes by NK. The US Senate's resolution, passed 93 to 3 in June 1994, urging the President of the US to prepare US troops for war likely led to NK signing the Agreed Framework. 53 It is likely the South Korean's will not be supportive of any kind of military response to NK. The US will have to make its case why a balanced coercion strategy is preferable to one that allows NK to continue to pursue its nuclear ambitions-which threatens US and regional security-or a strategy based on a high risk preemptive first strike with the attendant "hard landing" South Korea is loath to endure. 54 It is recognized without Japanese and more importantly South Korean support there is no chance of COA 3 being implemented. If this COA is chosen by the US then the US must convince Japan and South Korea that this COA is preferable to the consequences of a US retaliatory nuclear strike against NK should they be linked to a nuclear detonation in the US. In other words, Japan and South Korea must be made to understand that COA 3 is designed to reduce danger on the peninsula. However, should it fail, they are safer with a US initiated attack to destroy the regime than a US nuclear retaliatory strike. 55 David E. Kang, "International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War," International Studies Quarterly, 47 (September 2003): 307-309. In this article, Kang states most of NK's tanks were designed in the 1950s and its aircraft were designed before 1956. This antiquated equipment would be no match against state of the art US military equipment. 56 The regime is aware the US military crushed an Iraqi Army similarly equipped to NK. The US must be willing to increase its military strength in Korea with combat troops, Carrier Battle Groups, Expeditionary Strike Groups, Marine Expeditionary Brigades, and US Air Force Expeditionary Wings as required to aggressively coerce NK into compliance with US provisions. 57 China does not desire a sudden collapse of North Korea due to the economic/security implications for its southern regions. China has demonstrated its security concerns regarding a nuclear equipped NK via its role in previous four/six party talks. China is also expanding its role as an international player and is connected to the global economy. Although China could gain advantage by the US getting bogged down and overly focused on NK they do not gain from a US preemptive strike on NK or the resulting democratic reunification of the peninsula. Russia would probably lose from a destabilized global economy or a destroyed NK regime as it continues to search for economic markets. 58 The North Korean regime has show remarkable tenacity in pursuing its courses of action due to its confidence in its negotiating prowess. As was discussed in the section on North Korean negotiating strategy, the regime has the psychological edge when it comes to negotiations. The US consistently gets out maneuvered and therefore must change its strategy if it is to change the current negotiating paradigm. 59 The credible use of military force must be used whenever NK attempts brinkmanship tactics or fails to comply with previous agreements. Any compromise of this counterbrinkmanship strategy will undermine all US negotiating efforts. 60 Laney. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid.
